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H. L. A. Hart argues that strict criminal
liability often undermines the moral
condemnation associated with punishment and
therefore its capacity for deterrence. Hart
explains that insofar as legal punishment
expresses the "odium, if not the hostility"' of a
community towards those who break its laws,
strict liability forces us to either condemn those
who are not deserving of condemnation or to
negate the moral condemnation of the law in
general. One choice is immoral and the other
reduces the effectiveness of a significant
deterrent and is therefore counterproductive.
Either way, the consequences of strict liability
are undesirable. In this paper, I will defend
Hart's thesis against its objectors. I will also
propose and defend an original reason to believe
Hart's thesis. I will build my case around the
crime of statutory rape, although discussion of
principles and objections will involve other
crimes.
The state's ability to condemn through
punishment is essential to deterrence and is
undermined by strict liability. When rational
individuals consider whether to commit a crime
such as statutory rape, they consider a number of
factors. By far, the most important is the
immorality of the action. Long before fear of
punishment enters the picture, personal morality
usually ends the consideration. Part of this
personal morality is reinforced by the
implications of punishment. If the state reserves
the word "rapist" for only those who commit
heinous crimes with full knowledge and intent,
then agents will feel compunction towards
anything that might earn them the that title. We
do not want to be morally equivalent to an agent
who has sought out a young person and used his
age and authority to take advantage of her. A
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could not have reasonably foreseen. If an agent
did not know that his partner was underage, if he
had taken reasonable steps to make sure she was
not underage, if she took steps to convince him
that she was not underage, many would find the
agent morally blameless. However, in this case,
strict liability rape laws would still hold him
accountable for punishment. Thus the word
"rapist" is now broadened to mean more than
"vilest of human beings," or some equivalent
value judgment. If we would punish this agent,
we must change the term to mean "vilest of
human beings or individual who carelessly or
confusedly had intercourse with a minor." This
new title is weaker and less deterrent.
Individuals are less afraid to risk getting this
label because they know that it carries less social
stigma than the original definition of 'rapist'.
Individuals will scorn rapists less because plenty
of rapists, by this definition, are not awful
human beings. Further affecting condemnation,
the vileness of the crime is weakened by
apparently conflating purposeful action with
accidental. By treating both intentional and non-
intentional action the same, the law seems to say
that plotting to take advantage of a young girl is
no worse than having sex with a girl who one
had no reason to believe was under age.
Perhaps the employment of strict liability
punishment in cases of statutory rape would not
actually increase the amount of people who
committed statutory rape. Even if this is so, the
effect of strict liability cannot be written off.
Strict liability damages the deterrent power of
moral condemnation beyond the scope of the
crime that it is actually punishing. First, is it
likely that accepting strict liability for one crime
will create precedent for its application other
crimes, exasperating whatever problems are
already associated with strict liability. More
significantly, weakening the government's
capacity to make moral condemnations in one
area necessarily weakens its ability to do so in
related areas. If I read in the paper that a court
found a man guilty of statutory rape without
having considered his intent, I will assume that
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mine is the sort of government for which moral
innocence is irrelevant. When the next article
talks about man imprisoned for smuggling (a
crime without strict liability), I will wonder
whether his moral guilt was really considered in
the trial. In any case, I will have far greater
sympathy towards criminals in general since I
cannot operate with the pretense that all those in
prison are morally guilty. Once a system admits
of guilty charges against morally innocent
people, citizens cannot look at any branch of that
system without an ever-present doubt.
Hart's opponents will object that the state's
ability to condemn is not limited by citizens
learning that morally innocent people are
punished. After all, morally innocent people go
to jail all the time and we still have respect for
the law's moral condemnation. Not only that,
but legally innocent people go to jail. Hart's
opponents will remind us that no legal system is
perfect, that mistakes are made, and that
somehow we manage to cope with these
problems without becoming disenchanted with
our justice system. It might be sad that the full
brunt of the law is brought against innocents
every day, but citizens will accept it when to
demand more rigorous standards would cripple
the justice system. Yet this objection ignores a
crucial distinction between those unfairly
punished by more conservative liability
standards and those punished by strict liability.
First, while in the former case individuals
mistakenly have their moral character called into
question, the latter case makes no pretense of
examining their intentions. That is to say, when
we read about a rapist sentenced without strict
liability (suppose, by reckless liability), we may
fear that the state has made a mistake and that it
was some horrible coincidence that brought this
agent into his fate, but we believe that the state
has done everything reasonable to make sure
that his intentions were not good; we can doubt
whether the state competently applied its
condemnation, but we have no doubt whether or
not it was thoughtful in its application.
Conversely, to when the state condemns
someone under strict liability, there is no
pretense that new evidence of character or
motive (a journal, a letter) could be uncovered to
discredit the sentence-the state condemns
without consideration. This is a relevant
distinction. Any claim that our population
tolerates errors in the system without losing
respect assumes falsely that strict liability
punishment will be looked upon as mistakes
within the system rather than thoughtlessness of
the system itself. Secondly, the errors of
traditional justice usually go unnoticed, but
when they are seen they do cause a stir. If a
population notices that the government
repeatedly convicts innocent men and women,
that population will begin to feel sympathy
towards arrestees and suspicion regarding the
government's condemnation. That United States
citizens are not up in arms about our
implementation of justice implies that mistakes
are few or are quiet, not that they do not
undermine respect for condemnation. The
damage of bringing a slew of counterintuitive
strict liability verdicts will not be dampened by
any supposed tolerance built into the system.
Hart's objectors might then try to produce
examples of strict liability laws that do not drag
down the states ability to condemn. Every year,
thousands of American's pay fines for late
filing. If an agent turns in his forms late, he must
pay a fine no matter his knowledge, intention or
opportunity. Despite this, the state's
condemnation is not dependant upon a lengthy
trail process to consider the filer's state of mind.
Why should we think that strict liability for rape
would somehow deplete the state's ability to
condemn in a way that this does not? However,
objectors have assumed that all punishments and
crimes carry moral condemnation when in fact
laws vary in the level of moral condemnation
they express. Indeed, some laws do not express
moral judgment at all. Because Hart is dealing
with the deterrent power of condemnation, it is
individual perceptions of condemnation that
must be considered. Most citizens feel that fines
for late filing are not signs of moral turpitude or
reasons to feel guilty. In fact, many citizens may
feel as though tax law gives them the legitimate
choice to file their taxes late as long as they are
willing to pay the fine. They may be busy,
forgetful, or just lazy, but we will be unlikely to
fault them morally for incurring a fine. "Late-
payer" is not a title to hide from in the same way
as "rapist". For the latter to be applied widely
without consideration of motives would weaken
the power of label in a way that the former
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would not. Strict liability may be called for
because of practical concerns for the IRS, or
parking fines, or any number of other cases, but
objectors will not be able to produce a case
where punishment is bound up with moral
condemnation, and yet legal precedent and
common intuitions will allow strict liability
without a cost to moral deterrence as a whole.
Although Hart does not make them, there
are other arguments in support of his thesis. If
we are concerned about strict liability working
against the law by reducing citizens' respect for
the moral condemnation of punishment, we must
be worried not only about the actual issues of
justice, but also the widespread perceptions and
intuitions about them. Take for example the
apparent virtue of expedience that strict liability
brings to courts. With no need to establish
motive or knowledge, trials would simply be a
matter of determining the factual events of the
case. Often, these will be furnished by ready
confessions of defendants who expect to be
acquitted on grounds of ignorance and good
intentions. Many of these confessions will come
without any request for an attorney. Clearly,
these sorts of trials will take less time. To
outside observers, this creates an image of
assembly line justice. It seems odd that a serious
crime like rape could be tried more quickly than
a less serious one like petty theft, yet the need to
establish mens rea might very well make the
latter more time-consuming. It implies that
courts are too careless to devote the appropriate
time to cases that warrant them. It also implies
that the courts do not know the difference
between serious crimes and less serious crimes.
Objectors will counter that this argument applied
to the justice system as a whole would
encourage courts to deliberately increase the
length of trials across the board. This objection
draws too much from my comment. It is not true
that maximizing trial time maximizes perception
of justice and moral condemnation; there is a
significant negative stigma associated with
lengthy trials. Nevertheless it is true that citizens
need a minimum standard of procedure to imply
that the state understands the gravity of its
decisions. When a court convenes for a few
hours before sentencing a man to ten years in jail
for a crime he did not know he was committing,
it sends the message that the state does not care
about things that are very important to private
citizens. Of course, this message is true; the
damaging results of the state not caring about
motive and knowledge are what is essential to
strict liability. But the speed of the trial relative
to how long it seems it should take, and how
long other trials take, make this point especially
clear and make its negative effect upon moral
deterrence that much greater.
Hart argues that the power of moral
condemnation is hindered by strict liability, and
this claim holds up to critics. Attempts to show
tolerance for misapplication of condemnation
are not sustainable in light of relevant
distinctions between their examples and the case
of strict liability for statutory rape. Furthermore,
additional perception issues, specifically
citizens' expectation for how quickly (or,
slowly) good justice ought to work, create even
more reason to believe that citizens will not take
the state's condemnation as seriously under
strict liability codes. Clearly, for rape and other
crimes, the strongest arguments for strict
liability have gone unaddressed: whether the
deterrent effect of strict liability is overriding
and whether the practical concerns of certain
crimes are such that citizens will understand the
measures the state takes. These are questions
which cannot be answered here. It is a policy
maker's task to weigh the effect of punishing
more morally guilty people, increased deterrence
and incapacitation, against the effect of
punishing more morally innocent people, loss of
deterrence due to less effective moral
condemnation. On these grounds, policy makers
must decide for which crimes, if any, strict
liability is justified. This paper has proven that,
if she is to do so, she must do so with the
knowledge that a justification is indeed required.
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